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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION (UNAVEM II)

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in response to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 890 (1993) of 15 December 1993, by which the Council requested the Secretary-General to inform the Council as soon as an effective cease-fire was established, and in any case by 1 February 1994, on progress made by the parties in the Lusaka talks, including a report on progress achieved in furthering the peace process, establishing an effective cease-fire and implementing relevant Security Council resolutions and the "Acordos de Paz" (see S/22609, annex). The Security Council further requested the Secretary-General to keep it regularly informed of developments relating to the possible augmentation of the existing components of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) in the event of significant progress in the peace process.

I. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

2. Since my last report to the Security Council dated 14 December 1993 (S/26872), my Special Representative, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, with the support of the representatives of the three observer States (Portugal, Russian Federation and United States of America), has pursued his efforts to bring the Lusaka talks between the Government of Angola and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) to a successful completion and to have the parties reach an agreement on a comprehensive peace settlement aimed at establishing an effective and sustainable settlement of the Angolan conflict within the framework of the "Acordos de Paz" and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.

3. On 11 December 1993, the parties adopted the general and specific principles, as well as the modalities, including a timetable, relating to all military issues on the agenda: the re-establishment of the cease-fire; the withdrawal, quartering and demilitarization of all UNITA military forces; the demobilization as well as the disarming of all civilians; and the completion of the formation of the Angolan Armed Forces, including demobilization. At that

time, it was also agreed to take up immediately thereafter the other political issues on the agenda of the Lusaka talks, i.e., the police; the new mandate of the United Nations and the role of the three observer States of the "Acordos de Paz"; national reconciliation; and the completion of the electoral process; and, under the heading of "other pending issues", the re-establishment of State administration throughout the country.

4. However, on 13 December 1993, the head of the UNITA delegation informed my Special Representative that an area located near the city of Kuito/Bié had been bombarded. According to UNITA, "Dr. Savimbi had been in that area since 9 December 1993 to persuade the local UNITA military commanders to accept the terms of the agreements reached on the military issues during the Lusaka talks". The UNITA delegation felt that these air bombardments were a "clear attempt on the life of the UNITA leader and had been premeditated by the Government of Angola" and that their trust in the Government's good faith had therefore been shaken; hence they insisted that the Government provide explanations on the incident before they would continue participating in the peace talks. The government delegation strongly denied the allegations and asserted that the bombardments were "in reaction to" a UNITA military column that was moving towards Kuito/Bié.

5. In view of the seriousness of the situation, Mr. Beye travelled to Luanda on 13 December 1993 to consult with the competent Angolan authorities on this incident. The Government, and President José Eduardo dos Santos, considered that "the allegations made by UNITA were nothing but diversionary tactics on the eve of the meeting of the Security Council on Angola" and cited several other political, diplomatic and military reasons in rejecting the allegations.

6. In view of the conflicting claims presented by the Government and UNITA, my Special Representative decided to send to the area a fact-finding mission, chaired by the UNAVEM II Chief Operations Officer and composed of the UNAVEM II Senior Police Observer and of one military representative of each of the three observer States. My Special Representative proposed that, while the fact-finding mission carried out its tasks, the peace talks should continue. The government delegation accepted this proposal; the UNITA delegation, while accepting the fact-finding mission, insisted that it would resume participation in the talks only after the mission had reported its conclusions.

7. The fact-finding mission met on 16 and 17 December 1993 in Luanda with representatives of the Government, including the Angolan Armed Forces, with staff of the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit of UNAVEM II, and with representatives of the World Food Programme (WFP), which has been carrying out humanitarian operations in Kuito/Bié. On 18 December 1993, the mission members visited the city where they met with local representatives of the Government and UNITA, as well as with representatives of the local population. Based on the information obtained during this visit, the mission determined that:

(a) On 11 December 1993, an unspecified number of government air force planes had bombed UNITA military and logistic positions located in an area some 5 to 12 kilometres west of Kuito/Bié;

(b) There was no evidence that Mr. Jonas Savimbi was in the vicinity of the above-mentioned location at the time of the bombing raid.

From the foregoing, the mission concluded that, while the government air force did carry out a bombing raid against UNITA, there was no credible and conclusive evidence that the Government had intended to kill Mr. Savimbi.

8. While the fact-finding mission was in Kuito/Bié, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, in his capacity as Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Ad Hoc Committee on Southern Africa and Chairman of the front-line States, invited Mr. Beye to visit Harare, where the latter attended the front-line heads of State summit and also held consultations with President Mugabe. At the summit, Mr. Beye appealed to the front-line States to support the efforts of the United Nations aimed at continuing the peace negotiations in Lusaka until a comprehensive peace agreement had been reached.

9. After its return to Lusaka, the fact-finding mission submitted its report on 20 December 1993 to my Special Representative, who transmitted copies of the report to the delegations of the Government and UNITA, requesting their written reaction by the morning of the following day. The government delegation replied the same day that it had noted the contents of the report, and reaffirmed its readiness to continue the peace talks. The UNITA delegation, in a letter in the name of Mr. Savimbi dated 21 December 1993, "acknowledged receipt of the report and accepted to resume the participation of its delegation in the negotiations", while also indicating that "a break should be observed and talks could be resumed on 5 January 1994". The UNITA leader later addressed a similar request to me.

10. The negotiations resumed on 21 December 1993 and continued until 23 December in the form of proximity talks on a document relating to the agenda item on the police, which was prepared by the Special Representative and the three observer States. It was then agreed by all concerned to suspend the negotiations until 5 January 1994. Prior to the departure of the government and UNITA delegations, Mr. Beye and the representatives of the observer States decided to transmit a note verbale addressed to the Minister of External Relations of the Government of Angola and a letter addressed to Mr. Savimbi in which they, inter alia:

(a) Expressed their deep concern over the recent intensification of offensive military actions;

(b) Reminded the Government of Angola and UNITA of the appeal made by the Security Council that they "honour the commitments already made by them at the Lusaka talks by exercising maximum restraint", in compliance with resolution 890 (1993) of 15 December 1993;

(c) Reminded the parties of the Security Council's appeal to the Government and UNITA "to cease all military operations";

(d) Requested the Government and UNITA to send to the Special Representative a written commitment to respect the relevant provisions of paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 890 (1993) of 15 December 1993.

11. In order to obtain maximum support for these démarches, my Special Representative resumed his intensive consultations with the heads of State of the subregion. On 24 December 1993, he met with President Frederick Chiluba of Zambia, who expressed his continuing support for the United Nations efforts. Subsequently, Mr. Beye held useful consultations in Namibia with President Sam Nujoma on 27 December 1993. Upon his return to Luanda, my Special Representative met with President dos Santos, the Minister of External Relations of Angola, the President of the National Assembly and the Archbishop of Luanda. He then paid visits to President Miguel Trovoada of São Tomé and Príncipe, who is also the Chairman of the Conference of Portuguese-speaking African Countries, and to President Omar Bongo of Gabon, as well as to President Mobutu of Zaire. Meanwhile, on 4 January 1994, I met in New York with the Minister of External Relations of Angola, who delivered to me a letter from President dos Santos, and with whom I held an in-depth discussion on various aspects relating to the implementation of the peace agreement.

12. Consultations between my Special Representative and the leaders of neighbouring countries focused on the latest developments in the Lusaka talks and on the need for urgent action in order to ensure that the pause being observed would not devolve into a suspension sine die of the negotiations. Mr. Beye also requested firm and immediate intervention vis-à-vis the Government and UNITA, so that a truce could be observed pending the announcement of the cease-fire. My Special Representative received the support of all the heads of State concerned.

13. As scheduled, the peace talks resumed in Lusaka on 5 January 1994. During this second round, the composition of the government delegation remained the same. However, the UNITA delegation has changed significantly and is now led by its Secretary-General, Mr. Eugénio Manuvakola, while Mr. Jorge Valentim, the UNITA Secretary for Information, is the deputy head of the team. UNITA explained that the change was due to the fact that the military issues on the agenda had been thoroughly discussed and agreed upon, and that it had therefore been considered necessary to replace the military representatives with civilians.

14. The first plenary meeting was held on 6 January 1994 and was followed by several rounds of intensive proximity talks, combined with informal consultations on the agenda item dealing with the police. After lengthy discussions, these meetings resulted in the adoption of the general and specific principles concerning the police, including the adoption of several important points relating to the modalities governing the Angolan national police.

II. MILITARY SITUATION

15. Since my last report to the Security Council (S/26872), the general military situation has been marked by an intensification of hostilities. Information from the Government and UNITA confirms that skirmishes and ambushes have taken place in several locations in the country. The Government and UNITA have also intensified military preparations, aimed at a possible continuation of the war, should the Lusaka negotiations fail.

16. According to reports received from various sources and confirmed by UNAVEM II military observers, government and UNITA forces have continued to carry out operations in the provinces of Lunda Norte, Benguela, Kwanza Sul, Huíla, Malange, Namibe, Uíge and Kuito/Bié. UNITA has intensified ambushes and laid mines in several locations in the country. Movements and build up of UNITA troops and war matériel have been reported around the cities of Malange, Luena and Moxico. On 5 January 1994, the shelling of Malange prevented the aircraft transporting a delegation of United States congressmen from landing. The Government and UNITA accused each other of bearing responsibility for the incident. Reports of sporadic bombardments of Kuito/Bié were also received by UNAVEM II military observers.

17. In addition, the Government and UNITA have accused each other of launching attacks in several locations around the country. The Government asserted that, on 1 January 1994, UNITA attacked the Chevron petroleum installations in Cabinda; UNITA denied the accusation, saying that the attack was carried out by the Frente de Libertaçao do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC). UNITA, for its part, accused government forces of having carried out air raids over Uíge and Negage on 7 January 1994. Furthermore, in a letter dated 13 January 1994, the head of the UNITA delegation informed my Special Representative that a ship transporting Russian-made heavy armaments en route to Angola had been detained in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. UNITA's radio, "Vorgan", announced that the government army had continued to reinforce its troops in preparation for a large-scale military offensive in several regions of the country.

18. According to information provided by UNAVEM II military observers, the Government has reduced the defence perimeter of cities controlled by UNITA.

19. The military and police personnel of UNAVEM II currently comprises 47 military observers, 23 police observers and 11 military paramedics deployed in 5 locations: Luanda, Lubango, Namibe, Benguela and Sumbe. They continued to perform a number of important functions, including patrolling, maintaining extensive contacts with the local authorities, rendering support to humanitarian operations and conducting investigations.

III. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

20. Since my last report to the Security Council, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have made considerable progress in their humanitarian assistance activities throughout Angola. However, in spite of an increase in aid deliveries, there is still an urgent need to strengthen the capacity of both United Nations agencies and NGOs to address the enormous needs of the Angolan population. The recent deterioration in the overall security situation in Malange emphasizes the need to accelerate action by the international community in response to the overwhelming needs of the Angolan people.

21. My Special Representative has continued to follow closely the major issues relating to humanitarian assistance. In Malange, on 22 and 25 December 1993, several security incidents occurred at the food distribution centre of the NGO

"Concern" during one of which a security officer was killed. On 27 December, a vehicle belonging to World Vision International was attacked by uniformed armed men travelling in a military vehicle. During the attack, one of the NGO's local workers was killed and two were injured. In an immediate response to these incidents, Mr. Beye visited Malange to make a formal inquiry. Since then, apart from a shelling incident that prevented a plane carrying visiting United States congressmen from landing there on 5 January, the city has been calm, and WFP now undertakes 8 to 10 flights per day to Malange from both Luanda and Catumbela airports in order to meet the required delivery level of 3,000 tons of food aid per month.

22. Revised estimates show that the total number of people affected in Angola stands at nearly 3.3 million, an increase of 300,000 since my last report. This estimate is based on four types of beneficiaries: displaced persons, conflict-affected and drought-affected persons and returnees who are in need of aid in the sectors of food, health, nutrition, water, sanitation and shelter. Of these, 2.1 million are in need of food aid.

23. With regard to access to areas of extreme need, significant progress was made in negotiations with both the Government and UNITA by the Deputy to the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs during his visit to Angola from 2 to 10 December 1993. The purpose of his mission was to review United Nations emergency relief activities with particular focus on:

(a) Improving the monitoring of all humanitarian supplies;

(b) Reducing transportation costs;

(c) Expanding emergency assistance throughout Angola;

(d) Reviewing requirements under the overall emergency programme in cooperation and consultation with the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit.

As a result of these negotiations, the Government of Angola and UNITA agreed in principle to increased use of two land corridors: Luanda to Malange and Lobito to Kuito/Bié, as well as to the opening of Catumbela airport in Benguela province for humanitarian air operations.

24. In mid-December, WFP was able to fly from Catumbela to Cubal, where the situation was critical. It was the first time that WFP was able to deliver relief supplies to this town since road convoys to that area had been disrupted in August 1993. As of 13 January 1994, WFP had been able to reach seven destinations from Catumbela airport - Malange, Kuito/Bié, Huambo, Luena, Saurimo, Menongue and Cubal - which will ease the congestion at Luanda and allow for increased deliveries. WFP now airlifts food and non-food items to 23 locations and accesses several other destinations by road, compared to only 13 two months ago.

25. As a further positive result of the efforts made by my Special Representative and the recent mission undertaken by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, UNITA officials in Huambo agreed to the increase in humanitarian assistance in UNITA-controlled

areas and signed an agreement allowing international NGOs to work in Huambo. The Executive Director of WFP, Ms. Catherine Bertini, visited Luanda on 21 and 22 January 1994 for discussions on the food aid programme, logistics and related topics. During her visit, Ms. Bertini also met with the Minister of External Relations and was received by President dos Santos, and a letter of understanding between WFP and the Angolan Government was signed.

26. United Nations agencies working in Angola have started to review the United Nations consolidated inter-agency appeal that was launched in June 1993 in order to update humanitarian aid requirements for the next six months and to introduce some rehabilitation elements in existing emergency relief projects in anticipation of an eventual peace agreement. It should be noted that priority areas for immediate funding are agriculture, health, nutrition, education and water and sanitation, which until now have received very little support.

27. The situation in the intensive conflict areas of Kuito/Bié and Huambo continues to require constant monitoring and more support in view of the overwhelming needs resulting from the collapse of social services. NGOs are being encouraged to go into these areas to cover the overall needs, but recruitment of staff experienced in dealing with such complex and often dangerous tasks has proved to be difficult. United Nations agencies, NGOs and donors have endorsed the proposal that the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit establish a field presence in these cities, as well as in Uíge and Malange, to allow for overall coordination and negotiation on behalf of all humanitarian organizations working in those areas. Meanwhile, in Menongue, the capital of Kuando-Kubango province, the situation appears to have stabilized. However, seeds and tools are now urgently needed for the planting season, which begins at the end of January.

28. The revision of the United Nations consolidated inter-agency appeal for Angola will also address two issues of cardinal importance in the framework of an eventual peace agreement: troop demobilization and the clearance of land mines. Timely action on these issues will not only prevent the further deterioration of living conditions in Angola, but will also link humanitarian assistance efforts to the peace process.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

29. Following the fact-finding mission on the bombardment of locations near the city of Kuito/Bié and the suspension of the Lusaka talks on 24 December 1993, the discussions were reconvened in the Zambian capital on 5 January 1994 to consider the agenda item dealing with the police. The adoption by the Government and UNITA of the general and specific principles relating to the police reconfirms their readiness and political will to pursue the talks in order to achieve a comprehensive peace agreement. This positive attitude is an encouraging development that should be sustained in order to maintain the momentum for a successful conclusion of the talks. I therefore urge the Government and UNITA to redouble their efforts to move the peace process forward.

30. In the coming weeks, an even greater effort will be needed by the Government and UNITA to address outstanding issues, including, in particular, the political questions on the agenda, namely, national reconciliation, the completion of the electoral process, the re-establishment of State administration throughout Angola, the question of the new United Nations mandate in the country and the future role of the three observer States. Above all, national reconciliation remains the primary objective of the peace process. As UNITA has indicated its readiness to dismantle its military structure totally and become a purely political party, it would be essential to reach an understanding on how to reintegrate UNITA personnel into various levels and branches of the Government and State administration. It is imperative that both the Government and UNITA continue to display flexibility in the ongoing negotiations and demonstrate by their actions their political will to achieve a long-lasting peace in Angola.

31. Taking into account the progress made in the Lusaka talks, I would like to reiterate the recommendations contained in my previous report, namely that, for the time being, the Security Council continue to adhere to the provisions of paragraph 14 of resolution 890 (1993), which would be the most appropriate way to handle the current situation. However, should circumstances so warrant, I will immediately submit to the Council my recommendations about the imposition of additional measures or for the review of those already in effect.

32. Regrettably, notwithstanding the progress made in the Lusaka talks, the military situation in Angola continues to deteriorate. I urge the Government and UNITA to respect the commitments already entered into during the negotiations, to exercise maximum restraint and to put an immediate end to all military operations.

33. In spite of the intensification of military operations, humanitarian activities by the United Nations agencies and NGOs have continued throughout Angola. This crucial humanitarian effort, while helping to alleviate the suffering of the affected population in many parts of the country, also helps to create a climate favourable to a political settlement. I should like to seize this opportunity to renew my appeal to the Government and UNITA to provide the necessary security for the efficient distribution of humanitarian aid to the people of Angola.

34. The peace talks have thus far not reached the point where an effective cease-fire can be established as a basis for the expansion of the current operation of the United Nations in Angola. However, I am continuing with the necessary preparations and contingency planning so that the Organization can be in a position to make an appropriate contribution as soon as a comprehensive settlement is achieved. In furtherance of this objective, a team of two United Nations experts has recently visited Lusaka and Luanda to make a preliminary assessment of the needs in connection with the current contingency planning exercise.

35. The personnel of UNAVEM II has continued to serve with exemplary dedication in difficult circumstances. I should like to pay tribute in particular to my Special Representative and to the Force Commander, for the determination with which they continue to carry out their responsibilities.